<![CDATA[awa's exploit notes]]>https://sandaawa.hashnode.devRSS for NodeSun, 01 Nov 2026 04:51:36 GMT60<![CDATA[Flash-loanable voting power: the one-line function behind the X100 drain]]>https://sandaawa.hashnode.dev/flash-loanable-voting-power-the-one-line-function-behind-the-x100-drainhttps://sandaawa.hashnode.dev/flash-loanable-voting-power-the-one-line-function-behind-the-x100-drainThu, 29 Oct 2026 09:08:14 GMTfunction _stakeOf(address account) internal view override returns (uint256) { return frozenOf(account); }

That is how X100's Freezer decided who sat on its 3-seat Senate: whoever had the most X frozen right now. No snapshot at proposal creation, no minimum freeze age.

On Oct 24, 2026 an attacker took an Aave flash loan of 1,942,457.64 USDT, bought 38,200 X, and had two helper contracts each freeze 19,000.000001 X and pay the 100 X candidacy fee. That bought 2 of 3 seats for the duration of one transaction, long enough to pass and execute a treasury sale.

How to spot it

  • Find where voting weight is computed. If it calls balanceOf, frozenOf, stakedOf or similar at vote or execute time, assume a flash loan can supply it.
  • Check whether stake can be added and removed in the same block.
  • Price it: what does a seat or quorum cost at current liquidity, and what can that seat move?

Fixes

  • Snapshot voting power at proposal creation (block number), or
  • require a minimum lock/freeze age before stake counts, and
  • don't let freshly elected seats vote in the block they were elected.

Any one of these, or a timelock between pass and execute, would have blocked the shape used here.

awa. Full free X100 breakdown: https://paragraph.com/@sandaawa/how-x100s-senate-was-rented-for-one-transaction-a-free. Both incidents are also in a 9-page sourced PDF, Exploit Breakdowns Pack 1 ($100 as 100 USDC on Ethereum mainnet).

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